THE RE-BIRTH OF THE BROADCAST FLAG: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD
PROTECT CONSUMER RIGHTS BEFORE EXPANDING THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION’S JURISDICTION.
INTRODUCTION
A critical debate is underway in the Senate about how to
protect copyrighted television signals in new digital form.1
Congress has mandated that all analog television broadcasts be
converted to digital form by 2009.2

Digital television would

improve picture quality for everyone, even for consumers that
only receive over the air free channels.3
The FCC is in charge of this transition, but fears that
movie studios will refuse to convert their movies and television
programs into digital format.4

The studios worry that viewers

can too easily record digital broadcasts and upload them to the
Internet, thereby violating their copyright protection.5

1

It’s

See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Implications of the Broadcast
Flag: A Public Interest Primer (Version 2.0) 10 (2003),
available at http://www.cdt.org/
copyright/031216broadcastflag.pdf (summarizing the unique
copyright effects of the broadcast flag)(hereinafter Ctr. for
Democracy & Tech).
2
Id.
3
FCC, Digital Television (DTV) Regulatory Information (last
visited Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/dtv.
4
In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, Joint
Comments of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et.
al., MB Docket No. 02-230, at I. (Dec. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.mpaa.org/Press/MPAA_Comments_02-230.pdf) [hereinafter
MPAA Comments].
5
Id.; See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Acts Against Pirating of TV
Broadcasts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2003, at C1.
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quite likely the movie industry will face the same digital
piracy issues the music industry is facing.6
Even if the movie studios agree to convert their shows from
analog to digital, it is unclear how this transition will take
place.7

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) attempted

to set the standard for digital television (“DTV”) broadcasts by
proposing the broadcast flag regime.

The flag appeals to movie

studios because it digitally locks DTV broadcasts to safeguard
against illegal redistribution of television content.8

Under the

proposed FCC order, the flag would be required on all new
televisions, DVD players, computers, and any other device that
could receive or playback television content.9
However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals struck
down the proposed FCC broadcast flag order down because it
exceeded the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction.10
attempted to regulate playback devices.11

The FCC has never

To justify this

expansion of power, the FCC reasoned that the broadcast flag was
necessary to assure content makers that their copyrighted

6

Id.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. (products currently on the market would fall under a
“legacy” exception and would still be able to receive digital
television signals.)
10
Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
11
See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1 (the FCC has
traditionally only regulated devices that receive television
content rather than devices that playback content).
7
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material would be protected against digital piracy.12
rejected the FCC’s argument.13

The court

As a result, the Senate is

considering granting the FCC additional power.14
However, the court of appeal did not discuss the consumers
also have rights at stake.15

Because it is unclear how the

broadcast flag will be implemented, consumers’ fair use right to
record and playback television programs could be limited.16

As

technologies evolve, consumers’ access to information should
also evolve.

However, the broadcast flag could limit the

expansion of consumers’ access to information by restricting
time and place shifting.17

Moreover, the public’s right to

receive information is protected by the First Amendment.

12

18

As a

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d at 708 (The Court of
Appeals did not analyze consumer rights, even though Petitioners
did address the argument in their briefs, because as a threshold
issue the court found that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to
pass the broadcast flag order.).
16
The fair use right to time-shift content was protected by the
Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984)(holding that consumers’ right
to time-shift, recording a television broadcast for later
viewing - constitutes fair use. However, the Court did not
explicitly protect space-shifting, recording a television
broadcast for personal use and shifting the recording to another
playback device in one’s house or car.)
17
See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1.
18
See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
("[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.
. . ."); Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States, 381
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
13
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result, consumers’ constitutional rights could be violated by
the broadcast flag.
In addition, the broadcast flag would have required all
devices capable of playing television content (demodulator
devices) to be approved by the FCC before their use, including
homemade devices.19

As a result, all computer networks built by

novice computer programmers to play digital television
programming would be outlawed unless approved by the FCC.20

Home

networks use open source code, and evolving First Amendment
jurisprudence has protected computer code as speech.21

As a

Nevertheless, "[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addresses are not free to receive
and consider them"; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
The First Amendment "protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."; The
right to receive information and ideas is an inherent corollary
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. Board of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1981) (The First
Amendment includes "the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences. . . .") (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); The right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences may not be constitutionally
abridged either by Congress or by the Federal Communications
Commission. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
19
See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1.
20
See id. (novice programmers build home networks that use open
source computer code that is capable of recording and playing
back high television programming.)
21
See Junger v. Daley, 209 F3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000)(holding that
even functional computer code is protected by the First
4

result, the broadcast flag could create an unconstitutional
prior restraint on the First Amendment rights of private home
programmers.22
As a result, the Senate should ensure these rights are
protected before it grants the FCC additional jurisdiction to
order a broadcast flag.

Otherwise, the courts should invalidate

the broadcast flag as a violation of fair use and first
amendment rights.
This Note examines the problems surrounding the
implementation of a broadcast flag including: infringing First
Amendment and fair use rights by limiting the public’s access to
information and banning the creation of specific software.
I discusses the history behind the broadcast flag.
analyzes the public rights at stake.

Part

Part II

Finally, Part III analyzes

how the broadcast flag could violate these rights, and why
courts should protect these rights if Congress does not.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
A. DEFINTION OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
The broadcast flag, or Redistribution Control Descriptor23,
is a digital code embedded in a digital broadcasting stream.

Amendment); see also Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d
429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
22
A prior restraint occurs when a state actor requires a speaker
to get permission before speaking. The Supreme Court has ruled
that prior restraints are given the utmost scrutiny and are
frowned upon. See Freedman
23
Id.
5

This prevents digital television reception equipment from
redistributing digital broadcast content.24

The effectiveness of

the broadcast flag regime is dependent on programming being
flagged, and receiving devices recognizing the flag.
Thus, the flag requires new demodulator products (e.g.,
televisions, etc.) to include flag-recognition technology.25
This technology, in combination with broadcasters’ use of the
flag, would prevent redistribution of broadcast programming by
limiting the capacity of receiver devices.26
B. HOW THE BROADCAST FLAG TECHNOLOGY WORKS
The broadcast flag creates a regulatory and technological
framework for controlling the redistribution of DTV broadcasts
received over the air by consumers.27

DTV works in essentially

the same way as traditional analog broadcasting, but because
digital signals can be compressed more tightly on the
electromagnetic spectrum, and because interference does not
degrade signals as much, DTV allows for more information to be
transmitted at a higher quality and resolution.28

24

As a result,

See id. at 16,027.
Id.
26
Id.
27
See In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Content Protection,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MB
Docket No. 02-230, P 4 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.commreg.pf.com/Pfdocuments/FCCRcdPDFs/Fcc03-273.pdf
[hereinafter FCC Report and Order].
28
Id.
25
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there is an increased worry by movie studios that high quality
illegal copies will be distributed on the Internet.29
Essentially, the broadcast flag, including both the flag
that is tattooed onto the DTV signal and the FCC rules requiring
technology to recognize the flag, is a mechanism for expanding
copyright protection that movie studios enjoy for DTV
broadcasts.30

It achieves this by acting like an invisible

tattoo on a DTV signal that requires special glasses to reveal
its presence.
The "flag" itself is simply a small amount of data added to
the DTV signal that cannot be seen, but that with the
appropriate technology can provide commands to the receiving
device.31

Thus, if a DTV signal tattooed with this "flag" is

received by a television equipped to recognize its presence, the
television will read the flag and obey whatever command its data
carry.32

On the other hand, if the same "flagged" signal is

received by a DTV that is not equipped with flag-recognition
technology, the set will display the accompanying video content,
ignoring the flag.33

29
30
31
32
33

See
Id.
FCC
Id.
See

Accordingly, the flag embedded in the

47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14).
Report and Order ¶ 13, J.A. 1260.
¶ 40, J.A. 1274.
id.
7

signal cannot do anything unless the device receiving the
broadcast signal is equipped with flag-recognition technology.34
C. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
In August 2002, the FCC issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking regarding digital broadcast copy protection.35

The

Commission sought input on whether to adopt broadcast flag
technology to prevent the unauthorized copying and
redistribution of digital media.36
In November 2003, the FCC adopted the broadcast flag
regulations, which required that all devices capable of
receiving digital television broadcast signals, manufactured on
or after July 1, 2005, include technology to recognize and
implement the broadcast flag.37

The Commission explained that

the threat of mass indiscriminate redistribution, although not
imminent, could deter high value digital broadcasts.38

It also

argued that the situation demanded preemptive action to assure
content owners that DTV broadcasts will not be indiscriminately
redistributed.39
The Commission also adopted an interim policy for approving
the technologies that could be employed by demodulator products
34

Id. ¶¶ 13, 39, J.A. 1260, 1273.
See Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, 17 F.C.C.R. 16,027
(2002) (herinafter Notice of Proposed Order).
36
See id. at 16,028-29.
37
See Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550
(2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 73, 76).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 23,552.
35
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to comply with the requirements of the Flag Order, and issued a
further notice of proposed rulemaking to address this and other
issues.40
The FCC Order required all “demodulation devices” (DTV
tuners, personal computers, digital VCRs, DVD recorders, and
personal video recorders) that are capable of directly receiving
DTV signals and have digital outputs, to incorporate the flagrecognition technology by July 1, 2005.41

The rule prohibited

these devices from sending flagged digital content to any other
downstream device that is not "compliant."42

Once a television

equipped to read the flag recognizes its presence, the
television is unable to send the content outside its walls
unless it does so through approved protection technology.43
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
A. PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
As a practical matter, this means that the flagged digital
content is thereafter blocked from distribution over the
internet, over any managed network outside the consumer's home
system, and to any other electronic device such as a cell phone,
personal computer ("PC"), digital VCR, or DVD recorder unless

40
41
42
43

See id. at 23,574-79.
J.A. 1294-95.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, J.A. 1260.
9

that device is itself equipped to preserve the "robustness" of
the flag.44
It is as if the bookstore tells you what you can and can’t
do with a book you purchase (e.g. read it once) and requires you
to enforce those limitations on transferees of the book.

Thus,

if after reading the book, you give it to a friend, with the
same restrictions (can only be read once) and it has already
been read, then the friend has the book, but can’t read it
(access) it.
The broadcast flag thus has a wide sweep.

It creates a

whole new regime of technical and copyright-related regulation
in one stroke: design regulation of electronic consumer
equipment, restrictions on internet use, licensing requirements
for downstream devices, and rules that will impede consumers
from engaging in lawful uses of broadcast material.45
The effects of the scheme are forbidding.

The FCC

characterized the cost of the Flag regime as "minimal,"46 and the
record lacked conclusive quantitative data regarding its cost.
However, it is clear that the Flag regime costs something, and

44

Id. ¶ 5, J.A. 1256-57, 1275-77.
See, e.g., Reply Comments of Philips Electronics North America
Corp. (herinafter Philips Reply), J.A. 1020; Comments of
Electronic Privacy Information Center (hereinafter EPIC
Comments), J.A. 734; Comments of Verizon, J.A. 936-37.
46
FCC Report and Order at ¶ 20, J.A. 1263.
45
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the added cost will likely be borne by consumers.47

The

encryption required to preserve the flag's robustness in
connection with downstream devices further compounds these
costs.48

Indeed, the FCC acknowledged that "[t]here may be

additional cost[s] to implement the flag to the extent
manufacturers cannot or do not rely on existing content
protection technologies."49
The Flag requirement also increases the complexity and
diminishes the functionality of a broad range of consumer
electronics devices.50

Consumers will have to determine whether

their existing peripheral devices will be compatible with flagequipped devices, whether flag-compliant devices from different
manufacturers are interoperable, and what uses of flagged
content will be permitted.51

For instance, any flagged broadcast

material that is recorded onto a DVD will not be viewable on
existing non-flag-compliant DVD players.52
B. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADCAST FLAG
The Broadcast Flag Order aims at a copyright problem,
studios' fear of indiscriminate redistribution of their
47

See id. ¶ 19 n.45, J.A. 1263. Comments of Public Knowledge and
Consumers Union, J.A. 908; Comments of Veridian Corp., J.A. 64849.
48
Comments of Electronic Frontier Foundation (hereinafter EFF
Comments), J.A. 722-24.
49
FCC Report and Order ¶ 14 n.29, J.A. 1261.
50
EFF Comments, J.A. 718-21; Consumers Comments, J.A. 917.
51
Id.
52
FCC Report and Order ¶ 21 n.47, J.A. 1263-64; see also EFF
Comments, J.A. 721.
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copyrighted content53, but it is not typical copyright law.54
Instead of focusing on infringing uses of DTV broadcasts (taping
a show and selling copies, for example), this new kind of
regulation puts the government in the business of redesigning
products that might be used to infringe.55

In the process, it

locks out many non-infringing uses, including fair uses of
copyright, innovative technologies, and open source developers.56
Because these collateral harms are unavoidable, technology
mandates should be a last resort, not a predictive strike
against hypothetical danger.
The Flag scheme affects consumers by indiscriminately
restricting uses of broadcast programming, and does so
regardless of whether these programs are entitled to copyright
protection, or are even copyrightable.57

For example, if the

Flag rules stay in place, consumers will not be able to send any
portion of a flagged DTV broadcast over the Internet for any
reason.58

53

Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,599
(Dec. 3, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. 73.9000-73.9009 (2004))
(justifying the broadcast flag as necessary "to preserve the
viability of over-the-air broadcasting" from the threat of
illegal internet redistribution).
54
See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 4(summarizing the
copyright effects of the broadcast flag).
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
EFF Comments, J.A. 721; Comments of Computer & Communications
Industry Association ("CCIA"), J.A. 688.
58
Id.
12

Under the flag, consumers could not e-mail a clip of a DTV
broadcast to an office, second home, or traveling family member,
even if the clip was uncopyrighted or it was newsworthy, such as
the State of the Union Address.59

In addition, consumers could

not use any clip that has been marked with the flag to make,
illustrate, or rebut an argument in an Internet discussion
group, website, or "blog.”60

In addition, consumers could not

share a clip of a DTV broadcast with a virtual classroom during
a distance learning lesson, or create original works using the
DTV broadcasts in ways that have not yet been conceived.61

No

one may be able to fully assess the extent of this loss, since
the new rule will halt creativity and innovation before it can
blossom.
The technical specifications of the broadcast flag mandate
do not explicitly foreclose fair use copying.62

Indeed, the

Commission repeatedly stated that "our goal of preventing the
indiscriminate redistribution of digital broadcast TV content
'will not (1) interfere with or preclude consumers from copying
broadcast programming and using or redistributing it within the
home or similar personal environment as consistent with
copyright law."63

59
60
61
62
63

But much fair use copying falls into the gap

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
13

between the rule and its implementation.

Moreover, the flag

could chill public debate and access to information in violation
of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech.
1. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution64
vests power in Congress to grant limited monopolies over certain
works.65

The Framers were concerned about granting absolute

monopolies, and were influenced by passage of copyright law in
England, the Statute of Ann,66 that limited the term of copyright
protection.
As a result, the drafter of the Copyright clause, unlike
other power-granting clauses in the Constitution, specified how
and why Congress could use this power.67

Congress was not given

the power to simply to enact copyrights for its own reasons or
for as long as it saw fit.68

Rather, Congress was only given

power "to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts" by
granting authors an "exclusive Right" "for limited Times."69
In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently stressed
that the purpose of the copyright law is not the narrow

64

U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 8.
Id.
66
Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19
(Eng.).
67
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L.Rev
1057, 1062; see eg. U.S. Const. art. I, 5. (specify)
68
See id.
69
Id.
65
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protectionism of profits for copyright owners.70

In Twentieth

Century Music Co. v. Aiken71, the Supreme Court, in analyzing
copyright law in the context of technological change, stressed
that when ambiguities arise, copyright law should be viewed in
light of its basic purpose to give the public benefit, rather
than rewarding authors.72

Although the Court was analyzing

copyright law through the now outdated Copyright Act of 1909,
the proposition is still relevant to current copyright
analysis.73
2. THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT & COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright protection has enjoyed increased protection in
the United States as content has become increasingly exported
around the world.74

For over thirty years, however, there has

been an uneasy balance between copyright law and First Amendment

70

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948) ("The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration."); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977).
71
422 U.S. 151 (1975); see also United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 158 ("[R]eward to the author or
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of
his creative genius.").
72
Id. at 156. ("[c]reative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts (citation omitted)...When technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must
be construed in light of this basic purpose.")
73
See Goldstein, supra note 1 at 102.
74
See Nimmer on Copyright
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protection.75

The general rule is that free speech cannot

violate copyright law.76

However, there are those that argue

some speech should be allowed to violate copyright law.77

75

Important works include C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience
What it Wants, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 311 (1997); Yochai Benkler, Free
as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999);
Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy,
Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23 (2001); Yochai
Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of
Information Production, 22 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 81 (2002);
Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the
Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 173 (2003); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and
Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970);
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147
(1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L.
Rev. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market
Hierarchy and Copyright in our System of Free Expression, 53
Vand. L. Rev. 1879 (2000); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, Saderup, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev.
697 (2003); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total
Concept and Feel," 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989). Though he did not
write explicitly in First Amendment terms, Professor Chafee
deserves credit for exploring the main arguments first.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I,
45 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1945).
76
See Goldstein, supra note 1.
77
Id.
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In 1970, as Congress debated what eventually produced the
Copyright Act of 197678, Professors Melville Nimmer and Paul
Goldstein published important articles on the balance between
copyright law and free speech.79

Professor Nimmer used a

“definitional balancing” test to determine the proper balance
between free speech and copyright law.80

He created a rule that

differentiated between expression and ideas, and posited that
expression was copyrightable while the ideas and facts contained
within them were protected by free speech.81
His ideas were given force of law by the Supreme Court in
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,82 in which
the Court held that copyright, through its limited protection of
authors, creates an incentive to produce speech that otherwise
would not exist.83

However, Professor Nimmer also stressed that

some expression could not be separated from its idea and was too
important to risk being censored by the right-holders.84

He

cited Abraham Zabruder’s footage of President Kennedy’s
assassination and Ronald Haeberle’s photographs of the My Lai
Massacre during the Vietnam War.85

78

Professor Nimmer advocated

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)).
79
Nimmer, supra note 1; Goldstein, supra note 1.
80
Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1189.
81
Id.
82
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
83
Id. at 558.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1198.
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for a compulsory license to these expressions for those who
copied them.86

Although these examples are extreme, they

illustrate why copyright protection is not absolute in either
length or strength.
Professor Goldstein was concerned about overly broad
copyright protection and the accumulation of rights by large
media firms, which he called “enterprise monopolies.”87

To

illustrate the dangers of both overly broad copyright protection
and abuses by powerful media companies, Professor Goldstein
cited Rosemount Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,88 in
which Howard Hughes tried to use copyright protection to
suppress an unauthorized biography about him.

One of Hughes’

companies bought the rights to the underlying articles the
author used and sued for infringement.

The Second Circuit

reversed a preliminary injunction against the publication of the
biography saying the defendants had a strong fair use claim.89
Professor Goldstein supported the court’s decision because
Hughes used copyright to censor expression rather than promote
it.90

86

Id.
David McGowan, Why The First Amendment Cannot Dictate
Copyright Policy, 65 U. Pitt L. Rev. 281 (citing Goldstein,
supra note 1 at 987).
88
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966).
89
Id. at 307-307.
90
McGowan, supra note 65 at 287; Goldstein, supra note 1, at
985-986.
87
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Contrary to Hughes’ attempt to use copyright law to limit
the public’s access to information, a fundamental goal of
copyright law is to promote “broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts” through a system of
private reward to authors.91
However, proponents of copyright protection claim copyright
law does not abridge free speech.92

Instead, they claim the

opposite is true, and that copyright law is an incentive to
create speech that otherwise would not exist.93
The Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises94 stated that copyright law functions as an
“engine of free expression”95 that gives economic incentive to
stimulate works for the public good.

According to the Court,

copyright law protects the expression of the idea and not the
idea or facts themselves.96

However, this does not mean that

copyright law is unconstrained by the First Amendment.
The purpose of copyright law is not simply the narrow
protectionism of profits for copyright owners.

Rather, its

purpose is to stimulate wider access to creative works.97

91

In

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975).
92
See id.
93
Id.
94
471 U.S. 539 (1985)
95
Id. at 558.
96
Id.
97
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
(“the copyright law...makes reward to the owner a secondary
19

addition, certain fair uses expand consumers’ rights to use
copyrighted works.98

This is this balance that comes into play

in today’s debate surrounding the broadcast flag.
3. FAIR USE
Copyright holders enjoy many exclusive rights.99

Congress

has provided copyright owners with a variety of exclusive rights
in their copyrighted work, including the right to reproduce,
prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, and
publicly display those works.100

However, those exclusive rights

"do not give a copyright holder control over all uses."101
Fair use was originally developed in the common law and was
considered necessary to help courts “avoid rigid application of
copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”102

The doctrine

of fair use was given statutory recognition in the Copyright Act
of 1976.103

In codifying fair use, Congress did not intend to

consideration.”); Zaccchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977).
98
Id.
99
17 U.S.C. § 106.
100
Id.
101
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 393 (1968).
102
3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 13.05
(1998 ed.) (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)).
103
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)).
20

“change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”104

The statute uses

four factors to determine if an allegedly fair use is protected:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.

105

However, it was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sony v. Universal106 (the “Betamax” case) that the high court
weighed in with its interpretation of what uses would be
protected by the fair use statute.

In Betamax, several studios

sued Sony, manufacturer of the Betamax recorder, for
contributory liability for copyright infringement because
104

See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) ("no real definition
of the concept has emerged ... [and] no generally applicable
definition is possible ... each case raising the question must
be decided on its own facts.").
105
The fair use doctrine was codified in Section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [defining the
copyright holder's exclusive rights], the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
106
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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Betamax users could record television broadcasts without the
copyright holders’ permission.107

The studios feared consumer

copying would erode their profits and take away their control
over copyrighted works.108

The district court found the studios

failed to prove that the VCR would damage their profits.109

The

Supreme Court held, using the four-prong fair use test, that
non-commercial, home-use recording of programs broadcast for
free over public airwaves does not constitute copyright
infringement.110

Although the holding is narrow, it specifically

gave fair use protection to consumer time-shifting of content.111
However, critics of the decision have pointed to its narrow
holding and reliance on the district court’s factual findings as
weighing against broad fair use protection.

112

In addition, the

Court’s holding was based on a narrow 5-4 majority.

Indeed,

some suggest that the Court's conclusions "would be different
based on a more contemporary record."113

Thus, it is unclear how

protective the Sony opinion is outside the narrow context the
Court defined.

107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
damage
center
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See
113
Id.
108

at 454.
History has in fact proven that the VCR not only did not
profits, but actually created the studios largest profit
in home video and DVD sales.
at 454-455.
Patry, supra note 80, at 201.
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Recently, the Federal Circuit recognized the continued
vitality of the fair use doctrine in the digital realm,
explaining that the Digital Millenium Copyright Act does not
"allow any copyright owner, through a combination of contractual
terms and technological measures, to repeal the fair use
doctrine."114
The Supreme Court, in reviewing a challenge to the recent
Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft,115 held
that one of the reasons the copyright extension act did not
violate the Copyright Clause was because of the fair use
protections already in place to ensure that copyright holders
did not infringe on protected rights.116
Moreover, movie studios’ profits have not eroded as a
result of fair use time-shifting.117

Instead, the studios’ entire

business model now depends on the home video market that
developed as a result of the Court’s protection of the VCR.118
Had the Court agreed with the studios’ fears of lost profits as
a result of the VCR, the entire home video market would have
been prematurely shut down.119

114

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381
F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
115
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
EFF Comments, supra note 2.
119
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Post-Sony decisions focus on the potential adverse impact
on copyright holder’s future profits.120

This too, is the major

argument content holders cite as the reason a broadcast flag is
necessary.121

However, to overcome a consumer fair use defense,

content holders must demonstrate a meaningful likelihood that
future harm exists.122

Given the history of VCR time-shifting and

its positive impact on content holders’ profits, digital time
and space shifting should also continue to be protected under
fair use, regardless of their arguable differences.
Moreover, it is unclear if the broadcast flag is
technologically capable of protecting all fair uses.123

As a

result, the Senate should wait to confirm that fair uses are
protected before granting the FCC additional jurisdiction to
implement the broadcast flag.
D. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The First Amendment to the Constitution states "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably

120

See MPAA Comments, supra note 4
See id.
122
Harper & Row Publishers v. The Nation, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
[hereinafter The Nation].
123
See Fred von Lohmann, Digital Rights Management: The Skeptics'
View (2002), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/20030401_drm_skeptics_view.php (noting
that the fair use doctrine has been modified by the courts to
keep up with new technology and should continue to do so).
121
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to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."124
The Supreme Court has expressed that the scope of the First
Amendment is versatile; the artwork of Jackson Pollack, the
music of Arnold Schoenber, or the Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll are “unquestionably shielded.”125

In addition, the First

Amendment establishes that access to information is a
fundamental value of the American political system.126
1. COMPUTER CODE IS PROTECTED SPEECH
Currently HDTV tuner cards and devices like Digital to
Audio converters allow users to create personal networks that
enable time and place shifting within their homes and personal
devices.127

Individual programming is necessary to operate these

home networks.128

In addition, individuals use open source code

to design programs that function in similar ways as commercially
available encoding programs.129

Under the proposed broadcast

flag, any individual programming for devices that receive or
transmit content is prohibited unless it contains and recognizes
the broadcast flag, and is approved by the FCC.130

124

U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
126
Id.
127
See Fred Von Lohman, supra note 105.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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However, the First Amendment’s protection has also been
applied to computer code.131

As a result, individuals that

program home video networks using open source code are protected
by the First Amendment, as set forth below.
In Junger v. Daley,132 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal
analyzed whether computer source code falls under First
Amendment protection.133

The plaintiff, Professor Peter Junger,

facially challenged provisions of the Export Administration
Regulations that banned exports of encryption software.134

The

court held that even non-traditional speech like musical scores
and computer source code, although not understood by the
majority of people, are still protected by the First Amendment
because they express information and ideas within their
respective fields.135

Although the court differentiated between

functional and expressive speech, and noted that limits on
functional speech would receive less scrutiny, it stressed that
both forms of speech and hybrid forms still receive First
Amendment protection.136

131

Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 429 (2nd Cir.
2001); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000(holding
computer code is protected like any other speech even if a
computer is required to understand its expression or function).
132
209 F3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
133
Id; see also Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 429
(2nd Cir. 2001).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 484.
136
Id.
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In Universal Studios v. Corley,137 the Second Circuit also
analyzed the difference between functional and expressive
speech.

The lawsuit was brought by the motion picture studios

under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act to enjoin defendants
from posting or downloading software that decrypted DVDs.138

The

court upheld the injunction, holding that computer code does
receive First Amendment protection.139

However, the court also

found that defendants’ decryption software functioned solely to
circumvent technological locks on DVDs, and was therefore
unprotected due to its capacity to promote piracy.140
The court did not mention decryption software for personal
use.

In addition, the court held the injunction did not ban

more speech than was necessary to further the government’s
interest to prevent piracy.

As a result, personal programming

of home networks should still be protected by the courts under
the First Amendment.
Home network programming, like DVD decryption software, has
both functional and expressive components.141

Users create home

networks to function by reading and transmitting content to
facilitate time and place shifting.142

However, unlike the

defendants in Junger and Corley, home networks do not upload or
137
138
139
140
141
142

273 F3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id.
See Fred Von Lohman, supra note 105.
Id.
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export any code.143

Moreover, unlike the defendants in Corley,

users that develop code to facilitate home networks, even if for
personal use, would be shut down by the broadcast flag.144
In addition, it would be inconsistent for the FCC to shut
down home networks that facilitate time-shifting because it
allows DVDs to time and place shift by letting consumers play
content on any DVD player, whether within the home, car, or
computer.145

The broadcast flag would shut down all personally

networked devices that allow time and place shifting unless the
devices are pre-approved by the FCC.146

Moreover, the broadcast

flag would not allow consumers to program code for commercially
approved devices that did not interact with each other.147

As a

result, if the Senate does not protect personal software that
facilitates home networks before it grants the FCC additional
jurisdiction to implement the broadcast flag, it may be
violating programmers’ First Amendment rights.
2. COMPILATION OF IDEAS IS PROTECTED SPEECH
Access to the media is an important right protected by the
First Amendment.148

An informed public is essential to political

143

Id.
Id.
145
Id.
146
See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1.
147
Id.
148
See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
("[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.
144
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discussion, elections, and in maintaining globally competitive
levels of education.149

With the advent of digital media, the

public increasingly gets information in more diverse forms,
places and methods than ever before.150

As a result of increases

in technology that allow for more personalized and portable
content, copyright holders are increasingly fearful they lack
the control to regulate the new media expansion.151
First Amendment protection does not require a speaker to
generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the

. . ."); Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States, 381
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, "[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addresses are not free to receive
and consider them"; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
The First Amendment "protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."; The
right to receive information and ideas is an inherent corollary
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. Board of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1981) (The First
Amendment includes "the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences. . . .") (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); The right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences may not be constitutionally
abridged either by Congress or by the Federal Communications
Commission. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
149
See Brandeis concurrence, Whitney
150
See Center for Democracy & Tech, supra note 40 at 30 (noting
how consumers’ access to digital media may be hindered by the
broadcast flag).
151
See MPAA Comments, supra note 4.
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communication.152

Cable operators, for example, engage in

protected speech activities even when they only select
programming originally produced by others.153

In addition, the

presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by
other persons is a staple of most newspapers' opinion pages,
which fall within First Amendment security.154
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
public has a First Amendment right to receive information.155

152

The

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 570 (1995).
153
Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 636 (1994) ("Cable programmers and cable operators engage
in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection
of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment").
154
Id. (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974)).
155
See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
("[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.
. . ."); Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States, 381
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, "[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addresses are not free to receive
and consider them"; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
The First Amendment "protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."; The
right to receive information and ideas is an inherent corollary
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. Board of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1981) (The First
Amendment includes "the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences. . . .") (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)); The right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences may not be constitutionally
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right to receive information is especially significant in
electronic media.

In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the

Supreme Court stated: "It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here."
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC156, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals cited Red Lion for the proposition that "the interests
of viewers should be considered 'paramount' in the First
Amendment calculus."157

In response to cases brought by Turner

Broadcasting System, the court struck down, as a violation of
the First Amendment, the FCC's "must carry" rules.158

These rules

required cable systems to carry all local broadcast stations
upon their request and without compensation, without regard for
the channel capacity of the system or the alternative viewing
choices foreclosed as a result.159

The court recognized that the

"must carry" rules prevented cable subscribers from receiving
cable networks' information and entertainment programming

abridged either by Congress or by the Federal Communications
Commission. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
156
768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
157
Id. at 1445.
158
Id.
159
Id.
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services, although such programming might be preferred over that
carried by local broadcast stations.160
The Betamax Court's conclusion that time-shifting is worthy
of protection results in an environment in which the benefits of
expanded access to information by the consuming public made
possible by new technologies are accorded great weight.
However, the Court did not directly cite any of its classic
First Amendment cases to support its holding.

It did, however,

cite its 1983 decision in Community Television of Southern
California v. Gottfried,161 as to "the public interest in making
television broadcasting more available."162

This view bears a

strong resemblance to language from several landmark First
Amendment cases, such as Associated Press ("[First Amendment] .
. . rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential
to the welfare of the public"),163 and Red Lion ("It is the right
of the public to receive suitable access to . . . ideas and
experiences which is crucial . . .").164

160

Id.
459 U.S. 498, 508 (1983).
162
464 U.S. at 454.
163
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
164
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
The Court's language in Betamax also bears a striking similarity
to its own earlier summary of the district court opinion in that
case:
Moreover, the court found that the purpose of this [timeshifting] use served the public interest in increasing access to
television programming, an interest that "is consistent with the
161
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However, The Nation,165 decided by the Supreme Court at the
end of the 1985 Term, made clear that the importance of
receiving particular information, standing alone, does not
justify copying that adversely affects the marketability of the
work.166

The case involved President Gerald Ford's memoirs.167

The publishers and copyright holders, Harper & Row and Reader's
Digest, intended to release the memoirs as a book but sold
prepublication excerpts exclusively to Time magazine.168

As a

result, marketability is a large factor in determining protected
consumer uses.
3. THE BROADCAST FLAG COULD VIOLATE CONSUMERS COMPILATION RIGHTS
Here, consumers’ compilation of edited content is protected
speech because it increases access to information.

As a result,

the Senate should protect these rights before it grants the FCC
additional jurisdiction to implement the broadcast flag.
III. CRITIQUE OF BROADCAST FLAG
A. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION
The broadcast flag, as a governmental mandate requiring
electronics manufacturers to equip their products with broadcast
flag recognition technology, amounts to an unconstitutional

First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access
to information through the public airwaves."
165
See The Nation, supra note 102.
166
Id. at 542.
167
Id.
168
Id.
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condition.169

If the government had directly imposed the

broadcast flag’s limitations on First Amendment speech, it would
be unconstitutional.170

Therefore, the broadcast flag creates

state action even though private actors are enforcing its
controls.

Thus, the broadcast flag is unconstitutional because

it allows private content holders to limit the public’s
constitutional right to receive information through time and
place shifting.
B. INFRINGED FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,171 the Supreme Court noted
that although an asserted governmental interest may be
important, when the government defends restrictions on speech,
as it would by granting the FCC additional jurisdiction to pass
the flag, “it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence of
the disease sought to be cured.’”172

The government “must

demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate
these harms in a direct and material way.”173
Here, there is not enough proof that illegal internet
redistribution of content, a potentially important government
interest, is so egregious and costly to the movie industry that
169

See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1.
See id.
171
512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994)
172
Id. (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F2d. 1434, 1455
(D.C. Cir. 1985)).
173
Id.
170
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it would justify chilling protected speech.174

Moreover, there

are indicators that time and place shifting are giving content
holders increased abilities to create more valuable personalized
advertising to consumers based on their viewing habits.175

Tivo,

a time shifting service, recently announced its increased
ability to monitor viewing habits thereby increasing the value
in television advertising.176
Moreover, the broadcast flag infringes protected computer
code in the form of programming home networks.177

Home

programming can either be viewed as expressive or functional
speech, or a hybrid of both.178

In either case, computer code is

protected First Amendment speech and cannot be infringed
lightly.

In addition, consumer-driven innovation is cut off

when users cannot tinker with existing technologies or develop
new ones that challenge market leaders.179
C. THE BROADCAST FLAG IS OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE
In addition, despite the FCC's protestations to the
contrary, the broadcast flag scheme will necessarily involve the
agency in shaping copyright law and the rights of content owners

174
175
176
177
178
179
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EFF Comments, supra note 4.
id.
COMPUTER CODE IS PROTECTED SPEECH, supra Part II.
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and consumers.180
FCC's job.

Making copyright law and policy is not the

It is Congress' job.181

While it is true that the TV broadcast flag scheme does not
completely bar a consumer from making a copy of her favorite TV
show, it does prevent consumers from engaging in other lawful
activities under copyright law.182

For example, as the D.C.

Circuit noted in American Library Association v. FCC,183 the
broadcast flag would limit the ability of libraries and other
educators to use broadcast clips for distance learning via the
Internet that is permitted pursuant to the TEACH Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, Title III, Subtitle C, 13301,
amending 17 U.S.C. 110, 112 & 882 (2002).184
This highlights that although proponents of the flag
justify it as prohibiting only "indiscriminate" redistribution
of content over the Internet, it actually prohibits both
redistribution over the Internet and personal uses of content,
regardless of their legality.

For example, if a congressman

wants to email a snippet of his appearance on the national TV
news to his home office, the broadcast flag scheme would

180
181
182
183
184

See id.
Petitioners brief in ALA v. FCC, at 43-50
See id.
See ALA v. FCC, supra note 10.
See id. at 697.
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prohibit him from doing so.185

Video bloggers would similarly be

unable to post broadcast TV clips on their blogs.186
The fact that the broadcast flag will limit lawful uses of
copyrighted content was detailed in the Congressional Research
Service Report entitled Copy Protection of Digital Television:
The Broadcast Flag (May 11, 2005).187

CRS concluded that while

the broadcast flag is intended to "prevent the indiscriminate
redistribution of [digital broadcast] content over the Internet
or through similar means," the purpose of the flag was not to
impede a consumer's ability to copy or use content lawfully in
the home, nor was the policy intended to "foreclose use of the
Internet to send digital broadcast content where it can be
adequately protected from indiscriminate redistribution."188
The broadcast flag has the potential to hinder activities
that are protected as "fair use" under existing copyright law.189
For example, a consumer who wished to record a program to watch
at a later time, or at a different location (time-shifting, and
space-shifting, respectively), might be prevented when otherwise
approved technologies do not allow for such activities, or do
not integrate well with one another, or with older, "legacy"

185
186
187
188
189

See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech, supra note 1.
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FCC Broadcast Order, supra note 5.
Id.
See FAIR USE, supra Part II.
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devices.190

In addition, future fair uses may be precluded by

these limitations.191

For example, a student would be unable to

email herself a copy of a project with digital video content
because no current secure system exists for email transmission.192
Thus, the broadcast flag gives the FCC power to determine
consumers' rights under copyright law and under the First
Amendment.193

It is Congress' duty, not the FCC's, to find the

proper balance of those rights, and Congress is limited in its
regulation of protected speech.

As a result, Congress should

not hastily determine these rights and limits.
D. THE BRODCAST FLAG IS NOT THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO
CURBING INTERET PIRACY
1. SECONDARY LIABILITY GIVES MOVIE STUDIOS A POWERFUL TOOL TO
HOLD ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURERS LIABLE FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT.
The Supreme Court’s recent holding in MGM v. Grokster194
creates an additional tool for copyright holders against
internet piracy.195

The Supreme Court articulated an “inducement”

test that held distributors of software could be liable for
contributory infringement, regardless of the software's lawful
uses, based on evidence that the software was distributed to
190
191
192
193
194
195
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Report at 5.3.
EFF Comments, supra note 4.
S.Ct. 2764.
EFF Comments, supra note 4.
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promote copyright infringement.196

This powerful tool continues

to help content holders deter copyright infringement.197

As a

result, the broadcast flag is not necessary as additional
copyright protection.
Moreover, the threat of litigation will continue to chill
emerging technologies that may induce copyright infringement.198
Product developers have, and will continue to limit their
products’ functionality for fear of being held liable for
copyright infringement.199
In 2001, four lawsuits claiming various copyright
infringements were filed against SONICblue, the manufacturer of
a personal video recorder (PVR) named the ReplayTV 4000.200

The

ReplayTV 4000 featured a number of unique features that enhanced
consumer autonomy including: 1. Send Show Feature, which allowed
consumers to send digital copies of recorded content to a select
few Replay customers, which is essence extended place-shifting
2. AutoSkip Feature, which allowed consumers to automatically
skip commercials, and 3. The Library Feature, like all PVR’s,
allows consumers to time-shift content.201

196

MGM v. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2768.
See EFF Comments, supra note 4.
198
Aaron A. Hurowitz, Copyright in the New Millennium: Is the
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Commlaw Conspectus 145 (2003).
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The litigation forced SONICblue into bankruptcy.202

The

subsequent owner of the technology removed the AutoSkip and Send
Show features, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the
suit.203

However, Replay never recovered in the marketplace and

those features are unavailable in any commercially available
products.204
2. THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT ACT GIVES MOVIE STUDIOS A
POWERFUL TOOL TO DETER CONSUMER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The Digital Millenium Copyright Act, which was passed in
part for the same copyright infringement concerns as the
broadcast flag,205 gives copyright holders an additional tool to
deter copyright infringement.206

Although it was not intended to

alter the balance between copyright owners' exclusive right and
the public's ability to make fair use of copyrighted works, it
has been used to do so.207
The Digital Millenium Copyright Act actually creates a new
set of rights to control access to copyrighted materials that,
although meant to deter copyright infringement, also affect fair
use protections.208

The Act allows content holders to

202
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Id.
204
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See EFF Comments, supra note 4.
206
Id.
207
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796,
at 75 (1998).
208
Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1095,
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aggressively litigate against parties that circumvent digital
protections, even if those uses do not violate the content
owner’s copyright.209

As a result, content holders have strong

preventative weapons against copyright infringement.
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.,210
the Federal Circuit confirmed that fair uses defenses did not
theoretically change under the DMCA.211

However, in Universal

Studios v. Corley,212 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal seemingly
limited the scope of fair use defenses under the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act by stressing that fair use does not
entitle a user to copyrighted material by the user’s preferred
technique or in the format of the original.213

The court heard a

challenge to the posting of software that allowed consumers to
back-up purchased DVDs.214

The software also allowed, through

circumvention of DVD copy-protection, to encode DVDs and post
them online for redistribution.215
As a result of litigation enforcing the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, consumers are deterred from internet piracy and

its Impact on Libraries and Library Users, 10 J. Intell. Prop.
L. 269 (2003).
209
Id.
210
381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
211
Id.
212
273 F3d. 429 (2nd. Cir 2001).
213
Id. at 459.
214
Id.
215
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creating programs that circumvent technological locks.216

Thus,

content holders have a strong stranglehold on copyright
protection.217

As a result, the broadcast flag is not necessary

to protect copyrighted content.
Moreover, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act shows the
dangers of increased copyright protection.

Although the Digital

Millenium Copyright Act explicitly retained the existing "fair
use" regime in the digital context, in practice fair use rights
were altered.218

As the Senate Report put it, the Digital

Millenium Copyright Act strikes a balance that aims to "make
available via the Internet the movies, music, software, and
literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius."219
However, like in Chamberlain, fair use rights are
challenged under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.
3. THE BROADCAST FLAG CHILLS TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Current technological limitations help spur the next
generation of product innovation.

As the D.C. Circuit

recognized in ALA v. FCC220, the broadcast flag unlawfully gave
the agency unprecedented authority over consumer electronics and
computer devices and any other device that can demodulate a

216
217
218
219
220

Id.; EFF newsletter.
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Id.
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
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television signal.221

Thus, not only would television sets need

to be pre-approved by the FCC because they receive television
signals, but the agency would have the power to pre-approve
computer software, digital video recorders, cellphones, game
consoles and even iPods if they can receive recorded digital
content.222
The FCC does not have the expertise to engage in this kind
of determination, and if given this authority by Congress, the
FCC will slow or eliminate the rollout of new technologies, both
private innovations meant for strictly personal use, and
innovations meant for broader consumption.223
It has been argued that the FCC’s certification process
would work in regulating these devices because thirteen
technologies submitted to the FCC were initially approved.224
However, prior to submitting their products to the FCC, several
manufacturers removed legal and consumer-friendly features of
their devices.225

In addition, due to the revolving nature of the

FCC’s chairman and commissioners, it is likely that fear of
agency denial will chill innovation.
E. THE SENATE SHOULD PROTECT THESE RIGHTS BEFORE GRANTING THE
FCC ADDITIONAL POWER
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Any legislation to reinstate the broadcast flag should be
considered in regular order.

If Congress ultimately decides to

legislate with regard to the broadcast flag, it should do so in
regular order, and not as part of a budget resolution or
appropriations bill.

These matters are not germane to the

budget and appropriations processes.226

Indeed, they are far too

important and controversial to be legislated on a spending bill.
If Congress ultimately decides that it must try and legislate
broadcast flag, it should do so only after considerable debate
and public input.
There is considerable evidence the public is greatly
concerned with the government's efforts to mandate digital
television and radio content protection for digital devices.227
Over 5000 individual consumer comments were filed in opposition
to the flag at the FCC, where so many consumer comments are
rare, and tens of thousands of citizens have contacted their
Congressional representatives over the past six months (since
the D.C. Circuit's decision) urging that the broadcast flag not
be reinstated.228

Clearly, this is an issue that deserves a full

and fair hearing, and not to be simply attached to a spending
bill.
CONCLUSION
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The broadcast flag would give the FCC unprecedented control
over a wide variety of consumer electronics and computer
devices.229

As a result, Congress should wait to determine the

true threats of piracy from digital television, and should
protect consumer rights and evaluate market solutions instead of
furthering government regulation.

The broadcast flag has been

referred as narrow because it purports to do nothing more than
protect content holders from rampant piracy.

However, for the

reasons discussed above, the FCC rule is anything but narrow and
could unconstitutionally infringe protected speech and fair
uses.
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